Civil War Letter, 5th NY - October 1863

 Oxford Times, November 18, 1863

Hd. Qrs. 5th A.C. Near Warrenton, October 26, 1863

I suppose you will want me to tell you about our late rapid and complete movements here in Va.  You, of course, know that we fell back from Culpepper to Centerville, but you may not know why we did so, and why we did not fight a great battle instead of retreating.  well, I will tell you.  

Lee moved his army behind the hills on the south side of the Rapid[..] (leaving a force for garrison in the fortifications) and gained a point in rear of our right flank, but so far distant that he could not be forced to an engagement unless he desired to fight, which he did not.  from his position he could get between us and Washington, thus cut off our supplies and perhaps overpower the garrison and capture the city. Such were the intentions of Lee.  Thus matters stood on Saturday eve, Oct. 10th.  Our only chance lay in a rapid retreat to Centerville.  As that place was the destination of Lee, it became a race.  In regard to distance, the race was about even, but our army was encumbered by its immense wagon trains, which must be pushed ahead, and covered by the army from the attacks of the hungry rebels.  The rebels had no such impediment, thus having decidedly the advantage in the race.  

Sunday morn Oct. 11th, we began a rapid retreat across the Rappahannock and at 11 o'clock that night all were across.  But Meade found it impossible for our heavy trains to keep out of the way and some expedient must be resorted to, to deceive Lee and gain time for trains  So on Monday instead of pushing on in the direction of Centerville, we re-crossed the river and advanced to Brandy Station. This brought Lee to a halt, and gave time for our trains, which was gladly improved. That night we recrossed the river and pushed on as far as Catlett's where we stopped on Tuesday.  Lee, now sure of our intention, pushed rapidly forward to gain Centerville with his main body, while part of his force was detached to harness our rear, thus to retard our march.  Wednesday we again pushed forward, all the trains having left during the night. There was constant skirmishing in our rear and often was the rear guard obliged to form in order to battle and drive back the rebels.  Still our march was rapid with no loss, or excitement however.  In this way [we] regained Bristow, when the main body of Lee's army came in contact with the 2d corps, which was our rear guard.  So you see that the rebels, instead of gaining our front had been distanced and struck our column at its rear. At the time of the meeting between the 2d corps and Lee's main body, our men were in decidedly a bad fix, had the rebels been aware how matter stood, but Lee all the time supposed himself at the head of our column instead of its rear. So instead dashing at once on this one corps and crushing it, he did as any other General would have done, and began to feel for us.  In those movements he was the looser.  

As our corps was next in advance of the 2d, Gen. Warren called on us for assistance, and we moved back 4 miles and took position on the right of the 2d. The rebels did not appear anxious to fight us that night, and only artillery fighting was done.  In this we gained a decided advantage.  Just at dark the rebels opened his batteries most furiously and for an hour the shot and shells flew a thick as ever I saw them.  Yet little damage was done.  Soon after dark all became quiet, and we moved off in the darkness and reached Centerville at midnight. Thus was he defeated, both in strategy and fighting.  He gained nothing by his toil and had to confess that in strategy he had found his equal in Meade.  

You judged rightly when you supposed my position far from an enviable one during our late march.  No sleep for four days and nights, except such as I could manage to get in saddle at the risk of falling beneath the feet of my horse.  On the go constantly, often carrying dispatches where it was not safe to travel, for fear of capture and of course the dispatches must be verbal that they may not fall into the hands of the enemy in case of the capture of the bearer.   Never was I more glad of an opportunity of resting than when I reached Centerville.  I was so worn from fatigue and loss of sleep that I could scarcely remember the shortest message ten minutes.  during the shelling at Bristow, I was under the hottest fire through which I ever passed. The same kind Providence preserved me through all, and here I am as good as new again, ready for just such another trip.  

You ask if there are any copperheads in the army.  Yes, but they are few, and are of that class who if ever they reach Heaven will find fault with extravagance of the All Wise in furnishing gates of pearl to the city of New Jerusalem, and would swear pine to be as good.  They are of that class called "bunnies" (rabbits) by the soldiers, and who  never fight, but are sick, lame, or have some excuse for being far to the rear in a place of safety.  They are universally despised.  

You will perhaps be astonished to learn that many of the old soldiers are re-enlisting. yet such is the case.  One Pennsylvania regiment all re-enlisted.  Had Pa soldiers been permitted to vote, the majority for Curtin would have been nearly 100,000.  The soldiers are as unanimous for Governor Curtin as the Ohio soldiers for Brough. So you can see what share of them are copperheads.

Yours,   L.